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Abstract The generic reference price system (RPS) can
impose a ﬁnancial penalty for patients using a brand name
drug instead of its generic alternative. Previous studies on the
impact of the RPS have not considered the potentially dif-
ferential effect of using generic alternatives for individuals
with a different socioeconomic background. However,
patients’ characteristics might determine their overall
knowledge of the existence of the system and thus of the
ﬁnancial burden to which they may be confronted. The
association between patients’ characteristics and the use of
generic drugs versus brand name drugs was analyzed for ten
highly prescribed pharmaceutical molecules included in the
Belgian generic reference price system. Prescriptions were
obtained from a 10% sample of all general practitioners in
2008 (corresponding to 120,670 adult patients and 368,101
prescriptions). For each pharmaceutical molecule, logistic
regression models were performed, with independent vari-
ables for patient socioeconomic background at the individual
level (work status, having a guaranteed income and being
entitled to increased reimbursement of co-payments) and at
the level of the neighborhood (education). The percentage of
generic prescriptions ranged from 24.7 to 76.4%, and the
mean reference supplement in 2008 ranged from €4.3 to
€37.8. For seven molecules, higher use of a generic alterna-
tive was associated with either having a guaranteed income,
with receiving increased reimbursement of co-payments or
with living in areas with the lowest levels of education.
Globally, results provided evidence that the generic RPS in
Belgium does not lead to a higher ﬁnancial burden on indi-
viduals from a low socioeconomic background.
Keywords Pharmaceuticals  Reimbursement  Reference
pricing  Socioeconomic factors  Cost-sharing  Belgium
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Introduction
Among the various measures employed by European
countries to control public spending on pharmaceutical
products, reference pricing is one of the most popular. A
reference price system (RPS) establishes a common reim-
bursement or reference price for a group of comparable or
interchangeable drugs, called a cluster [1–7]. The third-
party payer reimburses no more than the reference price for
all drugs within the same group. Therefore, a patient taking
a drug whose price is above the reference price has to pay
the difference. This extra patient cost is usually referred to
as the ‘‘reference supplement.’’ Such a system controls
drug expenditures for the third-party payer by (1) making
consumers and physicians decrease their demand for rela-
tively higher priced drugs, thus stimulating them to choose
less expensive alternatives and (2) stimulating price com-
petition in drug markets [2].
The most controversial issue in the RPS is the deﬁnition
of the cluster, which can be narrowly or broadly deﬁned.
The broader the deﬁnition of a cluster, the higher the
number of drugs for which the same reference price
applies. A system with clusters including only original
drugs that lost their patent protection and a possibly long
series of generic alternatives for that off-patent original
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[8]. This is the system in place in Belgium, Denmark,
France, Portugal and Spain [9]. Broader deﬁnitions of
clusters can be either (1) products with chemically related
active ingredients that belong to the same pharmacological
class (for instance the class of all drugs containing a statin
as active ingredient) or (2) products that may be neither
chemically identical nor pharmacologically equivalent, but
have comparable therapeutic effects (for instance different
types of antihypertensive drugs). Such a system is com-
monly addressed in the literature as ‘‘therapeutic reference
pricing’’ [2]. Typically, countries that have put such a
broader version of the RPS in place make use of a mixture
of narrow and broad clusters, depending on the types of
drugs. The Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Hungary have
such a system.
Most studies assessing the impact of the RPS cover its
effect on drug use, and changes in price and expenditures
[2, 5, 10, 11]. Those studies reported that the introduction
of reference pricing was followed by an increase in the use
of drugs priced at or below the reference level. Accord-
ingly, the use of the more expensive drugs decreased. A
price reduction for both the brand and generic drugs was
also observed. The reduction varied among the different
studies, but was usually higher for brand drugs than for
generic alternatives [5, 8]. Finally, most studies concluded
that the introduction of a RPS reduced drug expenditures
for the third-party payer. For Belgium, studies on the
impact of the RPS are in line with the international liter-
ature [12–18]. Indeed, population-based studies reported
that the market share of generics increased from 11% in
2001 to around 40% in 2007 and that savings for the third-
party payer amounted to €57 million in 2003 [14, 15].
However, it was estimated that in 2008, €60 million in
reference supplements was paid by patients on top of the
obligatory coinsurance [9].
While there is no doubt that the introduction of the RPS
led to ﬁnancial beneﬁts for patients and the third-party
payer, little is known about which patients bear the ﬁnan-
cial burden related to the reference supplement. Indeed,
only one recent study considers the impact of the intro-
duction of a generic RPS on consumer welfare [19]. The
authors found that introducing the generic RPS reduced
patients’ co-payments via a decrease in prices for both
brand and generic drugs. However, the authors relied on
aggregated data and thus could not measure the ﬁnancial
burden for patients paying the reference supplement when
using a brand name drug. Moreover, only a few studies
have considered whether adherence to the RPS depends on
patient characteristics [20–22]. Nevertheless, those char-
acteristics might determine whether patients are fully
aware of the existence and the consequences of a RPS and
consequently have an impact on the choice of drugs.
Characteristics such as age, gender and education have
previously been considered as important determinants of
health behavior [23, 24] as well as of how individuals
obtain health information [25]. Thus, if patients are not
equally aware of the existence of a RPS, those from the
weakest groups in society might end up using more phar-
maceuticals for which a reference supplement is due.
Therefore, a policy encouraging patient responsibility
should be closely monitored to avoid undesirable outcomes
in terms of disparities in access to health care according to
socioeconomic status.
The aim of this study was to establish whether the
generic price reference system, as introduced in 2001 in
Belgium, had a detrimental effect on the equity of health
care. We explored whether patients from lower socioeco-
nomic classes were prescribed more or less often costly
drugs with a supplement penalty within a cluster where
cheaper reimbursed medicines existed (generic alternative).
Given that pharmacist generic substitution (dispensing a
generic drug even if the prescription is for a branded ori-
ginal product) is not allowed in Belgium, the prescription
received by the patient determines the drug that will be
dispensed by pharmacists. Hence, if prescribed, it is the
patient’s responsibility to ask the doctor for a generic
alternative and to avoid the reference supplement. Since
the RPS is designed in such a way that the ﬁnancial
incentive and the initiative are shifted from the provider to
the demand side, such measures expose patients to the
ﬁnancial consequences of their drug use. However, the
possible implications of the system on the ﬁnancial
accessibility of different socioeconomic groups have never
been evaluated.
This article is structured as follows. In the ﬁrst part the
Belgian RPS is described. Data and methods used in
the empirical analysis are provided in the second part. In
the third part results are presented. The last section is the
conclusion.
The reference price system in Belgium
Belgium has a compulsory health insurance system with
broad coverage including drugs. Pharmaceutical reim-
bursement decisions are made by the Minister of Social
Affairs who is advised by the Drug Reimbursement
Committee (CRM/CTG).
1 The Drug Reimbursement
Committee submits advice for a new drug based on the
assessment and appraisal of a reimbursement request ﬁle
sent by a pharmaceutical company. The ﬁle includes an
overview of the clinical evidence for drugs for which the
1 Le Polain et al. [26] provide a detailed description of the decision
process that takes place for the reimbursement of a new drug.
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123company claims an added therapeutic value plus an eco-
nomic evaluation and a proposal for the reimbursement
conditions. At the same time, the company asks approval
for the requested drug price at the Ministry of Economic
Affairs. The CRM/CTG advises the Minister of Social
Affairs on the reimbursement basis, which might differ
from the requested price. Prices are not capped, but only
drugs in class 1 (drugs for which the company claims
added therapeutic value) can obtain a price premium. Pri-
ces for drugs in class 2 (with similar therapeutic value
compared to other drugs) must correspond to prices abroad
or to similar products. Finally, generics and copies inclu-
ded in class 3 must set prices applying a substantial rebate
on the original price of the brand drug [26].
Reimbursement for new drugs is set as a coinsurance
with a ceiling for patients. Coinsurance rates and ceilings
differ between patients with and without preferential
reimbursement and according to the reimbursement cate-
gories (which reﬂect the therapeutic necessity of the drug).
Table 1 presents the cost-sharing schemes in 2008.
Reimbursement of pharmaceutical expenses increased in
nominal terms by an average of 7.5% per year between
1990 and 2000 compared to an annual rate of 5.1% for total
spending on health care [27]. To control pharmaceutical
costs a RPS, called nationally the ‘‘reference reimburse-
ment system,’’ was introduced on 1 June 2001 for off-
patent reimbursable drugs provided that a generic alterna-
tive exists. Initially clusters included only original brands
and generic alternatives with the same dosage and the same
administration form. During subsequent years inclusion
criteria were relaxed in order to enlarge the scope of the
RPS. The most important change was made on 1 July 2005
when the deﬁnition of the cluster was extended to include
all drugs having the same active ingredient (so belonging to
the same ATC-5 classiﬁcation group) [28] independently of
dosage and administration routes [9]. Along with the def-
inition of the size of a cluster, the reference price is the
second most important component that deﬁnes a RPS. In
general, countries tend to deﬁne the reference price based
on the price of all or some drugs included in the cluster [9].
In Belgium, the reference price is based on a simple linear
reduction (percentage) in the original ex-factory price of
the brand drug. The result is then increased by the distri-
bution and delivery margins to obtain the public price, as is
the case for all drugs.
When the RPS was ﬁrst introduced in 2001, the per-
centage reduction in the original ex-factory price of the
brand drug was ﬁxed at 16% [9, 29]. It was then progres-
sively increased through the years and is currently equal to
30% for drugs included in the RPS for the ﬁrst time, to
32.80% for drugs included in a reference group for over
2 years and 35.15% for drugs included in a reference group
for over 4 years. The reference prices are revised four
times a year.
When public drug prices are decreased by national
compulsory measures, the reference price is affected and
decreased proportionally. For instance, in April 2010, a
new cost-containment measure introduced a biannual
application of a compulsory price reduction for ‘old’ drugs:
drugs reimbursed for over 12 years and less than 15 years
had their ex-factory price and reimbursement basis reduced
by 15%, and drugs reimbursed for over 15 years underwent
a 17% reduction. These reductions imply that the reference
price is reduced accordingly, twice a year (1 January and 1
July). Table 2 summarizes the percentage reduction
applied to the original brand drug price to obtain the
Table 1 Co-payments for ambulatory drugs in 2008
Reimbursement category Preferential
reimbursement
a
Non-preferential
reimbursement
Category A—Vital drugs (e.g., insulin for diabetics, cancer drugs, antiretrovirals) No co-payment No co-payment
Category B—Therapeutically signiﬁcant drugs for non life-threatening diseases
(e.g., antibiotics, antiasthmatics, antihypertensives)
15% with a maximum
of €7.20
25% with a maximum
of €10.80
Category B—Large package size 15% with a maximum
of €8.90
25% with a maximum
of €13.50
Category C—Therapeutically less signiﬁcant drugs for systematic treatment
(e.g. antiemetics, spasmolytics)
50% with a maximum
of €8.90
50% with a maximum
of €13.50
Category Cs—Drugs used for certain chronic illnesses (e.g., drugs for coronary
heart disease, antihisthamines, and vaccines)
60% without a maximum 60% without maximum
Category Cx—Contraceptives and antispasmodics 80% without a maximum 80% without maximum
a Preferential reimbursement of co-payment is granted to individuals who fall below a certain income threshold. On 1 April 2010 a new cost-
sharing scheme for pharmaceuticals was established in order to improve pharmacist’s remuneration while keeping the cost-sharing level of
patients constant
Source: Vrijens et al. [9]
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123reference price of the cluster. This percentage varies with
two factors: the number of years the original drug is
included in the RPS and the number of years the original
drug is already reimbursed by a third-party payer (TPP).
A consequence of the modalities of the RPS in Belgium
is that several pharmaceutical companies manufacturing
commonly used original brand drugs reduced their prices
to the level of the reference price. As this decreases the
price differential between the brand name and the
generics, the reference supplement for the patient can be
avoided and their market share remains unaffected [30].
Thus, for these clusters in the RPS containing original
brand drugs and generic alternatives, there is no ﬁnancial
penalty (the reference supplement) for the patient what-
ever the choice of drugs. For a total of 10.7 million
inhabitants, patients paid in 2008, on top of the obligatory
coinsurance, €60 million in reference supplements, cor-
responding to 10% of total out-of-pocket expenses for
reimbursed pharmaceuticals.
Like in many other countries that have implemented a
RPS, policymakers recognized the important role of
physicians’, pharmacists’ and patients’ behavior in the
prescription and use of drugs not incurring the reference
supplement. A set of measures for these three actors was
introduced to increase the impact of the RPS. Measures
for physicians include information campaigns as well as
the establishment of minimum percentages of ‘‘low-cost’’
drug prescriptions. The National Drug Information Centre
was asked to introduce a color-code schema in its infor-
mation products (book, web site, computer applications)
to indicate very clearly the costly drugs requiring a sup-
plement. Easily accessible price comparisons for all drug
groups were published on the website of the Information
Center, and the third-party payer (the National Institute
for Health and Disability Insurance -RIZIV/INAMI)
printed booklets with these price comparisons for all drug
groups for free distribution to all physicians. Low-cost
drugs include both generic drugs as well as original brand
drugs that aligned their prices to the reference price, as
described above. To ensure that prescription quotas of
low-cost drugs were respected, monitoring of the physi-
cian’s prescribing pattern and sanctions for physicians
who do not comply with the quotas were also set,
although these were rarely implemented [31]. In 2001, the
year of the introduction of the RPS, the share of low-cost
drugs represented 6.6% of all reimbursed deﬁned daily
dose (DDD): 4.2% for generic drugs and copies, and 2.4%
for original products that lowered their price to the
reimbursement basis. In 2008, the share of low-cost drugs
was 40.3% of the DDD (24.0% generics, 16.3% low-cost
brand name drugs). Only 11.8% of the total DDD of
reimbursed drugs entailed a supplement for the patient
[9].
The role of the community pharmacist in the delivery of
reimbursed drugs in Belgium is limited to providing
information to patients. Contrary to other countries, when
faced with a branded prescription, Belgian pharmacists are
not legally allowed to substitute an original brand drug for
a generic alternative. Only when the prescription is written
using the International Nonproprietary Name (INN) of the
drug are pharmacists allowed to deliver a low-cost drug.
However, prescribing by INN is not widespread in Bel-
gium: only 7% of prescriptions were written in the INN in
2009 [32]. Until recently, the pharmacists received a per-
centage of the pharmacy retail price (31%, VAT not
included). The legislator (Minister of Social Affairs)
ensured that pharmacists’ margins were the same in abso-
lute value for both generic and brand drugs. But by trig-
gering price competition, the RPS has indirectly
contributed to the erosion of pharmacists’ remuneration.
Since 1 April 2010, a new remuneration system for the
pharmacist exists. The pharmacist’s remuneration consists
of: (1) a ﬁxed payment per delivery (75% of total income);
(2) a variable payment as a percentage of the pharmacy ex-
factory price (20%); (3) a complementary ﬁxed payment
(5%). The ﬁxed payment equals €3.87 and aims to remu-
nerate the drug delivery. The variable payment or eco-
nomic margin pays for the operating cost of the pharmacy.
The complementary ﬁxed payment aims to remunerate
speciﬁc tasks including deliveries with the INN prescrip-
tion (€1.20 per delivery). By limiting the share of the
economic margin in the total remuneration, the new system
partially disconnects the pharmacist’s proﬁt margin from
the retail price.
Besides the ﬁnancial penalty (i.e., the reference
supplement) that patients pay when choosing a brand
name drug instead of a generic alternative, public
authorities and sickness funds launched some rather
limited information campaigns to encourage adherence
to the RPS.
Table 2 Difference between the reference price and the price of the
original brand drug
Number of years original
drug reimbursed by the
TPP
b
Number of years original drug included
in the RPS
a
New in
the RPS
(%)
In the RPS
for[2 years
(%)
In the RPS
for[4 years
(%)
Less than 12 years 30.00 32.80 35.15
12–15 years 40.50 42.88 44.88
[15 years 41.90 44.20 46.20
a Reference price system
b Third-party payer
Source: Vrijens et al. [9]
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123Methods and data
Study design and sampling
To study the link between patients’ socioeconomic char-
acteristics and the use of generic drugs versus brand name
drugs incurring a reference supplement in the context of the
Belgian generic RPS, a cross-sectional design and a two-
step sampling procedure were used. The ﬁrst step of the
sampling procedure consisted of selecting a random sample
of 10% of all prescribing general practitioners (GPs) in
Belgium. To exclude occasional prescribers, prescribers
with fewer than 200 prescriptions in 2008 were not inclu-
ded in the sample. The second step was to select all adult
patients having received at least one prescription from one
of the physicians selected in the ﬁrst step. Only adult
patients were included because the drugs selected in the
analysis are indicated for adults (and are given exception-
ally to children for very speciﬁc indications). For all
selected individuals (patients and physicians) detailed
information was obtained, including demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics, and information on all the
pharmaceutical products prescribed in an ambulatory set-
ting. For each pharmaceutical product received by a patient
in the sample, the co-payment as well the reimbursement
by the third-party payer was obtained. Information not
available at an individual level (income and education) was
obtained for the smallest geographical unit (statistical
sector) of the patient’s residence.
The selection of drugs was based on two criteria. First,
only clusters for which the choice between a brand and a
generic drug incurred a reference supplement for the
patient were included. Second, the restriction to commonly
prescribed clusters
2 had to guarantee a sufﬁcient sample
size. Molecules in our selection of clusters do not have a
narrow therapeutic margin, and thus switching patients
from the brand drug to the generic alternative does not pose
a health risk for the patient [33].
Data
Databases
The study period covered all pharmaceuticals reimbursed
during 2008. Data were extracted from several adminis-
trative databases. First, individual patient data were
obtained from the Intermutualistic Agency (IMA), a non-
proﬁt institution that collects information from all sickness
funds in Belgium [29]. Variables used in the analysis are
from three databases (collected by the IMA) that are linked
by the encrypted beneﬁciary number. Patients’ demo-
graphic and socioeconomic characteristics are from the
Population data set and information on pharmaceutical
products delivered in community pharmacies (not in the
hospital) from the Pharmanet database. Pharmanet contains
exhaustive information on pharmaceutical dispensing,
including the reimbursement category, number of pack-
ages, insurance reimbursements, co-payments, date of
dispensing and prescriber identiﬁcation number. Other
reimbursed acts (not relating to pharmaceutical products)
are registered in the Health Care database. Information on
patients having a medical record with their GP, patients
residing in a rest or nursing home for the elderly, and
patients enrolled in a primary care center ﬁnanced by the
lump sum was selected from this data set. Because these
data were not available for the year 2008, we relied on data
for 2007. Finally, because data on income and education
were not available at the level of the individual patient, we
used data at the level of the statistical sector (SS). Statis-
tical sectors divide municipalities into homogeneous enti-
ties according to several criteria making them reﬂect
similar ‘‘neighborhoods’’ in terms of socioeconomic, urban
and morphological characteristics. Statistical sectors vary
in size; sometimes they are not larger than a street or a
neighborhood. Data on education at the level of the sta-
tistical sector are based on the 2001 Census [34], and data
on income are available from the tax administration for the
year 2005. For the sample of prescribers in 2008, the third-
party payer provided information on gender and age.
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
Patients’ characteristics Age and gender for all patients
were obtained from the IMA data set. For the purpose of
the analysis, four age groups were created (18–44; 45–64;
65–74; 75 and more). Six additional dummy variables
describe other patients’ characteristics: living in a resi-
dential long-term institution for the elderly, receiving a
guaranteed income, being entitled to increased reimburse-
ment of co-payments, receiving a lump sum for chronic
illness, being inscribed in a medical care center and having
a global medical record with the GP. A more detailed
2 Within our large database, we selected the most prescribed
pharmaceutical molecules. More precisely, lansoprazole and glicla-
zide were the most prescribed for the alimentary tract and metabolism
group. For the cardiovascular system, we selected the most prescribed
diuretic (furosemide), beta-blocker (bisoprolol and thiazides) and
antihypertensive (diltiazem). Among quinolones, clarithromicine was
the most prescribed. Piroxicam was the most prescribed antinﬂam-
matory drug that is not delivered over the counter. Citalopram,
tramadol and acetylcysteine were the most prescribed antidepressant,
analgesic and mucolytic.
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Entitlement to a guaranteed income and to increased reim-
bursement of co-payments is conditional on a low income.
Thus, these variables serve as a proxy for low socioeconomic
background.Thevariables‘‘beinginscribedina medicalcare
center’’ and ‘‘having a globalmedical record’’ are includedto
capture patient loyalty to his/her physician. Patients can opt
for having a globalmedical recordheld bya particularGP. In
returntheyreceiveincreasedreimbursementfortheirprimary
care.Patientscanalsochoosetoenrollinaprimarycarecenter
ﬁnanced per capita and in return have free access to primary
care. Patients’ work status was categorized into four catego-
ries: unemployed, employee, self-employed worker, and
invalid or handicapped. Finally, being entitled to a lump sum
for chronic illness is an indirect indicator of health status.
Physician’s characteristics As generic substitution is not
allowed in Belgium, physicians’ characteristics were
included as control variables. For age, a categorical vari-
able regrouping individuals in four age groups was created
(25–34; 35–44; 45–54; 55 and older). Gender was repre-
sented by a dummy variable (1 for male).
Geographic information Five income groups were cre-
ated based on median taxable income for 2005. The edu-
cation level of the statistical sector of the patient was
aggregated using the International Standard Classiﬁcation
of Education (ISCED) [35]. We used the share of indi-
viduals having attained post-secondary education (ISCED
4 and 5) over the total population aged 18 years and older
(see Table 3).
Inaddition, a patient’s region of residence was includedin
themodeltocontrolforunobservableregionalcharacteristics.
Region of residence corresponds to Flanders (57.8% of pop-
ulation), Wallonia (32.4%) or Brussels (9.8%).
Statistical analysis
The observation unit was the prescription. As Belgium
opted for a generic reference price system, use of brand
drugs and their generic alternatives must be considered
within each cluster. Indeed, as physicians do not have to
choose among different active ingredients (as in a thera-
peutic reference price system), we consider that for each
speciﬁc molecule the decision is limited to whether or not
to use a generic alternative. The dependent variable in each
model was a dummy variable with a value equal to 1 if the
patient was prescribed a generic drug and 0 otherwise (i.e.,
using a brand drug and paying the reference supplement).
Logistic regression models were used to assess associations
between patients’ characteristics and the probability of
being prescribed a generic drug. The method of General-
ized Estimating Equations (GEE) [36] was applied to
adjust the variance of each parameter estimate for the
clustering of prescriptions within patients. As this method
limits the clustering to one level, variance estimates for
physicians’ characteristics, as well as those of small area
characteristics might be underestimated. All factors (except
the income variable) described in the previous section were
included in the ﬁnal model, whether statistically signiﬁcant
or not. This choice was made to allow proper comparisons
of effects across all drugs analyzed. Odds ratios and
95% CI were derived from these regression models.
P values presented are those of the effect of the factor as a
whole (i.e., testing if there is any difference between all
levels of the factor) and not P values from pairwise com-
parisons (testing each level of the factor to a reference
category).
Analysis of the model robustness revealed collinearity
problems between the two small area characteristics,
income and education. In our sample, correlation between
these two factors equaled 0.6. Sensitivity analyses revealed
that the education level was more discriminatory than the
income level, and thus only the education level of each
patient’s small area was used in the ﬁnal models (tables
including income are available from the authors).
Results
Selection of patients, prescribers and pharmaceutical
products
The random sample of 10% of all prescribers corresponded
to 826 GPs and to a total of 402,407 patients. For these
patients, 1,526,084 prescriptions corresponded to clusters
where a choice between a brand name drug with a refer-
ence supplement and generic alternatives existed. A total of
66 different clusters distributed in 7 anatomical main
groups (ATC-1) were identiﬁed (tables for all molecules
are available from the authors). The analysis was further
restricted to commonly prescribed clusters covering a wide
range of anatomical main groups and indications. Our ﬁnal
Table 3 Lower and upper limits to deﬁne income and education
quintiles of each statistical sector (SS-small area information)
Quintile Income (2005) limits in €
(based on SS median income)
Adults who attained
post-secondary education
(2001) (%)
Lower limit Upper limit Minimum Maximum
Q1 682 16,450 0 13.78
Q2 16,451 18,611 13.79 18.80
Q3 18,612 20,310 18.81 23.57
Q4 20,312 22,305 23.58 30.10
Q5 22,306 57,195 30.11 100
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123database contained a total of 368,101 prescriptions and
120,670 patients distributed in ten different clusters.
Descriptive results for the ten selected molecules
The ten molecules selected for the analysis were lansop-
razole, glicazide, furosemide, bisoprolol and thiazides,
diltiazem, clarithromycin, piroxicam, tramadol, citalopram
and acetylcysteine. The lowest percentage of generic pre-
scriptions is for piroxicam (20.9%) and the highest is for
citalopram (76.4%). The mean annual reference supple-
ment also varied considerably among the different mole-
cules from €4.3 for acetylcysteine to €37.8 for diltiazem
(see Table 4).
Figure 1 includes the median reference supplement
incurred by patients in 2008 and the percentage of patients
who actually paid it for the ten molecules in our sample.
The expected relation between both variables is in theory
simple: a high reference supplement should dissuade
patients from buying a brand drug. Indeed, in a generic
reference price system, drugs are considered interchange-
able in terms of beneﬁts and risks for the patients; thus,
only the price of each drug should play a role in deter-
mining which drug to use. However, patient preference as
well as physician’s prescription habits may also determine
the extent to which generic alternatives are used instead of
the more expensive brand [37, 38].
We found that for lansoprazole and citalopram a small
percentage of patients using the brand name drug end up
paying a high reference supplement. Indeed, differences in
the price between brand and generic alternatives (for cer-
tain administration forms) reach €9.21 for lansoprazole and
€13.04 for citalopram per package. However, for diltiazem,
the molecule having the highest median reference supple-
ment in our sample, this result was not found. A high
percentage of patients used the brand drug for diltiazem
and thus ended up paying the reference supplement. Our
results also show that the percentage of patients using the
brand drug was high for some pharmaceuticals for which
the median reference supplement paid in 2008 was small
(piroxicam, furosemide and acetylcysteine). For these
molecules, a difference in the price between brand and
generic alternatives per package was €6.2, €2.47 and €3.22
for piroxicam, furosemide and acetylcysteine, respectively.
A possible explanation might be that the price difference
between the brand drug and the generic alternatives is too
small to guide consumption behavior. However, patients
might also be more sensitive to differences in prices (even
if they are small) for pharmaceuticals used for chronic
conditions.
Table 4 Generic prescription and the reference supplement for the ten molecules included in the study
ATC-1 Level Analysis groups
(molecules and ATC-5 group)
Generic prescription Reference Supplement
Total Generic % Patients paying Amount (in €)
N % Mean Median Maximum
A—Alimentary tract and
metabolism
1. Proton pomp inhibitor
Lansoprazole 12,057 7,782 64.5 884 22.8 32.9 27.1 91.8
2. Anti-diabetic
Gliclazide 16,849 11,890 70.6 978 35.6 19.4 15.4 96.5
C— Cardiovascular system 3. Diuretic
Furosemide 42,827 16,212 37.9 9,564 64.3 6.1 3.3 209.9
4. Beta blockers
Bisoprolol and thiazides 57,849 35,964 62.2 3,650 27.1 18.2 16.4 65.8
5. Antihypertensives
Diltiazem 34,125 8,425 24.7 3,911 67.7 37.8 36.3 161.6
J—Antiinfectives for systemic use 6. Quinolone antibacterials
Clarithromycin 19,438 13,797 71 4,581 28.8 8.7 7.6 180.3
M—Musculo-skeletal system 7. Anti-inﬂammatory drugs
Piroxicam 36,393 7,596 20.9 18,614 81.0 8.3 5.9 156.9
N—Nervous system 8. Analgesic
Tramadol 67,332 24,100 35.8 13,904 67.4 16.6 7.3 726.0
9. Antidepressant
Citalopram 25,567 19,535 76.4 1,365 17.7 31.8 21.7 187.7
R—Respiratory system 10. Mucolytic
Acetylcysteine 55,664 25,351 45.5 19,955 54.5 4.3 3.2 146.4
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Table 5 presents the results of the analysis for the ten
molecules. To simplify the interpretation of our results, we
try to identify trends in the association between patient
characteristics and the probability of using a generic
alternative for the ten clusters.
Patient and physician demographic characteristics
Patient and physician demographic characteristics were
introduced as control variables. The role of patient age and
gender in the use of a brand versus a generic drug within
the context of the reference price system is not straight-
forward. The association between patient age and gender
and the probability of using a generic drug was found to be
rather heterogeneous over the ten molecules. While for ﬁve
active ingredients (diltiazem, clarithromycin, piroxicam,
citalopram and acetylcysteine) men had a higher proba-
bility than women of receiving a generic drug, for lan-
soprazole the opposite result held. For the other molecules,
gender did not play a role in using a generic drug. These
results are in line with previous studies where patient
characteristics such as gender, age and ethnicity have little
or no association with the use of generic drugs [38, 39].
The age of the patient even had a less pronounced asso-
ciation with the probability of using a generic drug. For
three drug clusters (piroxicam, tramadol and diltiazem)
patients aged 18–44 years were more likely to use a gen-
eric alternative. For the combination of bisoprolol and
thiazides, younger patients had a smaller probability of
using a generic alternative.
The same conclusion holds for the association between
physician age and gender and the probability of using a
generic drug. Physician gender played a role in prescribing
behavior in six groups. Male doctors prescribed more
generics for lansoprazole, furosemide, bisoprolol and
thiazides, and piroxicam, and less for citalopram and ace-
tylcysteine. Although physician age was also associated
with prescribing behavior, no clear pattern was identiﬁed
for the ten molecules.
Patient health status
Although the separate analysis for the ten molecules
increased the homogeneity of patient health status within
each group, differences remain. No direct health status
information was available in the databases. However,
entitlement to a lump sum for chronic illness can be
interpreted as an indirect measure of health status. The
variable was included as a control variable. Compared to
more healthy individuals, patients receiving a lump sum for
being chronically ill were less likely to use a generic
alternative for diltiazem, tramadol and acetylcysteine. The
opposite held for bisoprolol and thiazides.
Patient socioeconomic characteristics
Patient socioeconomic background was proxied by three
variables available at the individual level and one at the
level of the statistical sector. For the individual character-
istics—work status, having a guaranteed income and being
entitled to increased reimbursement—some patterns can be
observed. Having a guaranteed income was associated with
a higher probability of using a generic version for biso-
prolol and thiazides, clarithromycin and citalopram, and a
lower probability for diltiazem. This last result is rather
striking, since diltiazem has the highest reference supple-
ment (see Fig. 1, Table 4). Higher use of a generic alter-
native of furosemide, piroxicam, acetylcysteine and
citalopram was also associated with patients being entitled
to increased reimbursement.
Work status was associated with the use of a generic
drug for ﬁve active ingredients (furosemide, bisoprolol and
thiazides, claritromycin, tramadol and acetylcysteine) but
with opposite results. Compared to pensioners, which is our
reference category, the probability of using a generic ver-
sion of furosemide was higher for the other work status
categories. On the contrary, for bisoprolol and thiazides,
pensioners were more likely to use its generic version than
all other groups. For clarithromicyn, tramadol and acetyl-
cysteine, invalids and handicapped patients were less likely
to use a generic alternative than pensioners.
Patients living in small areas with low education levels
were more likely to use a generic alternative for six types
of drugs: furosemide, bisoprolol and thiazides, clarithro-
mycin, piroxicam, tramadol and citalopram. Only for ace-
tylcysteine the opposite result was found: individuals living
in more educated areas were more likely to use generic
alternatives.
Lansoprazole
Gliclazide
Furosemide
Bisoprolol and thiazides
Diltiazem
Clarithromycin 
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The two variables reﬂecting patient loyalty to his/her
physician were associated with a higher probability of
using generic alternatives in several groups of drugs.
Patients enrolled in a primary care center were more likely
to receive generic alternatives in six groups: furosemide,
bisoprolol and thiazides, piroxicam, tramadol, citalopram
and acetylcysteine. Patients having a global medical record
were more likely to be prescribed generic versions in nine
out of the ten groups (except for lansoprazole). A possible
explanation for the higher generic drug use in primary care
centerscouldbethatgenericprescribingisanessentialpartof
their policy [40]. Moreover, there is some evidence that the
type of practice may inﬂuence prescription behavior of
physicians [39]. A possible explanation for the larger prob-
ability of generic drug use for patients with a global medical
record might be that, since having a medical record is pos-
sible onlyifpatients ask their preferred GP to keep one, these
patients have a better knowledge of the health system,
including the existence of the reference supplement and how
to avoid it. Another hypothesis is that patients and physicians
usingsuchatoolmightbebettersuitedtodiscussprescription
choices and thus use the less expensive alternatives.
Rest and nursing home for the elderly
Residing in a rest or nursing home for the elderly was
associated with a higher use of generic alternatives for
lansoprazole, furosemide, clarythromicin and citalopram.
For acetylcysteine, the opposite result was found.
Regional characteristics
Compared with individuals living in Brussels, those living
in Flanders and Wallonia were more likely to use generic
alternatives in seven out of the ten groups that were ana-
lyzed (glicazide, furosemide, diltiazem, clarithromycin,
piroxicam, tramadol and citalopram).
Discussion
There are many different approaches to evaluate a refer-
ence price system. A number of studies have tried to
evaluate its effect on outcome measures such as drug use,
changes in prices and cost for the third-party payer and for
patients. Only a few studies have directly assessed its
impact on ﬁnancial accessibility [20–22]. However, a ref-
erence price system might impose a larger ﬁnancial burden
on more disadvantaged individuals if their knowledge of
the existence and consequences of the system is not the
same as that of more privileged individuals [41].
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst article directly ana-
lyzing the possible unintended differential impact of a
generic reference price system on individuals with a dif-
ferent socioeconomic background. Several results are
worth mentioning. First, the most stable results for the
association of patient characteristics and the probability of
using a generic drug were found for variables reﬂecting
patient loyalty to his/her GP. However, both variables
could also be interpreted as reﬂecting a patient’s sensitivity
to the cost of care. Patients with a medical record beneﬁt
from a 30% reduction in the co-payment of a GP consul-
tation. Patients enrolled in a primary care center do not pay
any co-payments. Maybe these patients are more informed
on how to reduce their health care expenditures. In addition
to this, one peculiarity of the pharmaceutical market is that
the demand for pharmaceutical specialties is not deter-
mined solely by patients, but instead jointly by patients,
prescribers and pharmacists. Having a medical record as
well as being enrolled in a primary care center might also
reﬂect how patients and physicians interact. Indeed, if
those tools allow doctors to better internalize the health and
ﬁnancial cost for patients, they might result in a more
efﬁcient prescription behavior.
We did not identify a consistent pattern between the use
of a generic drug within clusters in the RPS and patients’
socioeconomic characteristics. There are a number of sig-
niﬁcant differences for individual drugs, and speciﬁc sub-
groups, but their clinical relevance can be questioned.
Furthermore, the characteristics of the drugs may also be
important: drugs for acute (hence short) use, drugs for
serious complex conditions (e.g., diltiazem in cardiac
patients, mostly prescribed initially by the cardiologist) and
drugs perceived as strong brands (gliclazide, furosemide,
piroxicam, acetycysteine). However, except for diltiazem,
either a positive relationship, or none at all, between the
use of a generic drug and a lower socioeconomic status was
found. In terms of ﬁnancial accessibility, the generic price
reference system in Belgium seems to work well.
Although the results do not provide evidence that the
RPS imposes an unbalanced ﬁnancial burden on low-
income patients, some patients are still bearing the cost of
using brand drugs when a cheaper alternative is available.
How can it be explained that there are still prescriptions
entailing a reference supplement? This question is partic-
ularly important in a system of generic reference pricing
with narrowly deﬁned clusters where potential differences
in clinical effectiveness of generic and brand drugs can be
regarded as negligible. Some hypotheses can be put for-
ward. First, no nationwide information campaign directed
towards the general public was organized. Second, generic
substitution by pharmacists is not allowed. In Belgium, the
pharmacist can dispense a low-cost medication only when
prescriptions are written using the International Non-
Patient socioeconomic determinants of the choice 311
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use the INN. Third, for physicians the time investment
necessary to have a sound knowledge of the rapid changes
in prices as well as their prescription habits may create a
barrier for prescribing the less expensive alternatives [37–
39]. Finally, the perception of generic drugs by GPs may
play an important role. A number of surveys have been
carried out in Belgium on this topic. Vrijens et al. [9]
provide an overview of these surveys and conclude that the
perception of generic drugs among GPs is positive, but that
the reasons why they do not prescribe them are varied:
price reasons (when the original has the same price as the
generic alternative), because speciﬁcally asked for by
patients, certain reticence about quality, or because it
concerns very speciﬁc therapeutic indications. Further-
more, patients show a high degree of conﬁdence in their
physician. Even though they are aware of the existence of
generic drugs and overestimate the price differential, they
hesitate to ask their prescriber to change the prescription.
The extent to which a reference price system is able to
attain both the policy objective of controlling expenditures
as well as being equitable essentially relies on the inter-
action among the physician, the patient and the pharmacist.
Measures in Belgium have mostly been directed toward
patients and physicians. A step further may be to allow
pharmacist generic substitution. In addition to this, to avoid
inequities among patients, introducing a cost-sharing
measure that intends to provide patients with monetary
incentives to alter their consumption behavior should be
accompanied by measures increasing patients’ awareness
of the ﬁnancial consequences of this behavior.
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Having a global medical record
reduces fees for GP’s visits
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